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A SKETCH

OF

THE MEANS AND BENEFITS

OF

PROSECUTING THIS WAR

Against Britain.

BY BENJAMIN ELLIOTT.

"We are all Federalists;—we are all Republicans. If there be any among us, who would wish to dissolve this Union, or to change it's republican form, let them stand undisturbed, as monuments of the safety, with which error of opinion may be tolerated, where reason is left free to combat it."

"I believe this the strongest government on earth. I believe it, the only one where every man at the call of the law, would fly to the standard of the law, and would meet invasion of the public order, as his own personal concern."

JEFFERSON.

"Blest seat of Freedom! o'er thy favor'd clime

"The circling beams of promis'd Glory shine;

* * * * *

* * * * * thine the soul,

"No threats can terrify, or Fears controul;

"Whose dauntless courage the Enchantment broke,

"And Neptune's mansions to their centre shook."


EDWIN C. HOLLAND.

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CHARLESTON, S. C.


PUBLISHED BY JOHN L. WILSON, AT THE CHARLESTON GAZETTE OFFICE.

1814.

Elliot



TO THE PUBLIC.



That these sheets will present new views to the enlightened political enquirer, is not anticipated. The motive of compiling them, was to furnish a few simple data to the plain, honest citizen, whose avocations forbid research, by which he might appreciate the power of his country, and satisfy himself, that the support of her sons ensures the triumph of the Republic.

Credible documents authorise every assertion.

A SKETCH, &c. &c.

A COLLISION between the American Republic and British Monarchy, was apprehended by all who shared our revolutionary toils, and by such as observed the spirit with which the tyrant of the colonies contemplated the splendid ascension of the Free and Independent States. The dismemberment of her western possessions left a wound which time will not cicatrize. Pride has been exasperated at discomfiture—avarice at the loss of wealth, and envy fears the probable successes of a youthful rival. Chatham prophetically had announced, “the day is not far distant when America may vie with these kingdoms not only in arms, but in arts also.” “Relinquish America!” exclaimed an able member of parliament (anno ’78) “relinquish America! What is it but to desire a *giant* to *shrink* spontaneously into a *dwarf*.” In the house of lords the duke of Richmond declared—“I have been and yet am of opinion, whenever the parliament of Great Britain acknowledges the *Independence of America*, the *sun* of England’s glory is *set forever*. Such are the sentiments I possessed on a former day, and such the sentiments I continue to hold at this hour. It is the sentiment of lord Chatham, and *many other able statesmen*.” Ministerialists with confusion remembered the truth which Burke had so often repeated to them—that “Whatever England had been growing to by a progressive increase of improvement for a series of *seventeen hundred* years, as much was added to her by America in *a single life*.” They felt that this treasure had been lost by their unprovoked oppression, and insufferable arrogance—and lost not until genius had appreciated its richness, and warned them of the tenderness with which it should be guarded. In these feelings which could be assuaged only by the ruin or vassalage of our country, and not in any particular misunderstanding, easy to be accommodated, we shall discover the spring of those overwhelming aggressions, against which hostilities are the only efficient bar-

Man V. Hendley, Oct. 29/16, p. 52

rier.* The instrument which promised us amity was scarce completed, when exclusion from the West Indies, an instigated savage war, commercial spoliation, and the lamentations of our seamen, attested the efficacy of parchment-protection. A mild administration sent a messenger to ask a mitigation of our wrongs. The entreaties of Mr. Jay procured a boon which was spurned by the majority of the American people, and considered by its acceptors as a compromise of national honor with national interest—The sacrifice was offered but the dæmon not propitiated. Our citizens were yet outraged in property and in person. An American, passing in a coasting vessel on his own shores, was murdered for not obeying the orders of a British cruizer. This lawless and incensing deed was barely complained of, when the Chesapeake, unsuspectingly leaving port, was inhumanly and cowardly assailed—many on board wounded and killed, and (lest the maddening indignity should be incomplete) mustered by the command, and compelled to bear the inspection of, a *petty lieutenant*. Scarcely was this aggravation perpetrated, when our commerce was declared dependent on the English privy council; and cargoes destined to markets to which they prohibited trade—forfeited. This act was not promulgated merely to deter, but millions have been wrested from our merchants for—disobedience. Henry was dispatched to enkindle discord in the happy family—to array state against state, and to make the son distain his poignard with his father's blood!! An incendiary apostle ("The Prophet") was missioned to prepare the Indian tribes for massacre, and to have the tomahawk lifted when the signal should be given! Conciliation was exhausted, and our reasoning was answered with the taunts of imper-

* We have the testimony of that ancient patriot, John Adams, that a spirit existed in Britain, which it was foreseen would eventuate in war. In a letter dated Quincy, July 6, 1812, to Mr. Elkanah Watson, he mentions—"How it (the war) can be said to be unexpected, is another wonder: I have expected it more than *five-and-twenty years*, and have great reason to be thankful that it has been postponed so long. I saw *such a spirit* in the British Islands, when I resided in France, in Holland, and in England itself, that I *expected* another war much sooner than it has happened. I was so impressed with the idea, that I expressed to lord Lansdown (formerly lord Shelburne) an apprehension that his lordship would live long enough to be obliged to make, and that I should live long enough to see another peace made, between Great Britain, and the United States of America—I have lived to see the WAR."

tinence. The outcries of our mariners made the world enquire, whether republics were destitute of commiseration, and insensible to contempt? Wrong accumulated on wrong, pressed America to the dust. Pelion had been thrown upon Ossa, and Olympus would have towered above Pelion. Our country was trampled, and nothing but an immediate and vigorous effort could save it from being crushed, and buried in infamy. War therefore was declared—June 18, 1812, the previous day 37 years, the first great battle for American liberty; that of Bunker Hill was fought.

It was foreseen, that in a community where a boldness of reasoning and acting is the birth-right of each; and where the infant imbibes the principle, that man is the creator and not the creature of government, this eventful resolve of the public council would impel to a diversity of conduct the most decisive if not alarming. By some it was heard as the annunciation at which the Republic would rise from the grave of insignificance, and unfold the attributes of a new existence; by others it was received as the knell of political hope and felicity. Traitors saw in imagination, a night approaching suitable to their schemes. Demagogues dreamed of the thrones reared from the fragments of popular sovereignty, and exultingly anticipated that modern Athens would ape the Athens of antiquity. Meetings were held, some to applaud others to denounce the measure. Conspicuous was that in the town of Boston—The “scotched” serpent of the revolution, old, exiled tores, had returned to the cradle where he first assailed the youthful Hercules. Driven to the freezing clime of Nova Scotia, charity had permitted him to revisit his former abode, to bask and revive in the rays of independence. To poison the heart, to deaden the hand which had preserved him, was the designed remuneration. Aspiring partizans instilled doctrines subversive of federal concord; and infatuated zealots were struggling to precipitate the citizens into all the miseries of disunion. Anarchy was divested of its horrors, and, that the ensnared victim might more readily venture within its cruel grasp, the dæmon of civil discord was enrobed in the habiliments of a delivering angel. A baleful meteor it was thought would rule the day of this meeting. Every friend of America, who entered *Faneuil-Hall*, awaited in tremulous dread, to hear the work of domestic dissolution determined on, planned, and commenced—But a brighter sun never illumined the native-spot of Hancock. Circe had prepared her cup—but it was Ulysses she had

to beguile. The first speaker that arose was—Samuel Dexter—an unvarying federalist. The proud monuments of '76 were yet dear to freemen—the tombs of their Warren and their Adams, were yet sacred—The United States exhibited a fraternal confederation—Should all these be ~~severed~~, were the momentous themes of discussion?

reversed

With an eloquence equalling the crisis, he forced to their view the bloody scenes which reason contemplated among our dismembered states—how other communities, pre-eminently Greece, when united, were the terror, envy, and wonder of their age—when severed, their wretchedness educed the pity, their insignificance the contempt of mankind. He reminded them that our union was not the spurious bantling of chance or coercion, but formed in the hour of affliction, it had been cemented by similarity of suffering, and latterly strengthened by reciprocation of benefits. The idea of the United States becoming independent communities was fallacious. The nations of Europe had never been members of the same government, and therefore a discordance of feeling would continue them asunder. Americans were sufficiently assimilated in habits to live under the same political system. Should licentiousness rend and throw aside the bands of affection by which they were now encircled, after a short saturnalian delirium they would find themselves again linked together—but with the chains of a tyrant. Besides the better sentiments of our nature command us to support the Federal Constitution. All our fellow-beings are now groaning under the galling yoke of power. Americans only, were blessed with a government, that with the tenderness with which the mother protects her helpless babe, guarded, or endeavored to guard its citizens from the evils to which humanity is exposed. Against such a government shall we uplift the arm of opposition?

Angels once rebelled against heaven, forget not the retribution which awaits ingratitude. His audience were solemnised, much by the enchantment of oratory, more by the majesty of exalted patriotism. It was the soul of Aristides inspiring the tongue of Demosthenes. Ambition was abashed, and treason became despondent. The deluded honest man was touched—all the American rose in his bosom, and he dropped a tear of contrition, at having thought of abandoning his country at the moment of her trial.

Opposition had been so organized, that the address of Mr. Dexter

was not completely successful. It was determined that a state-convention should be convened, and a General Convention recommended. His intrepid resistance however, impressed the conviction, that constitutional measures would meet the support of the people, and their impolicy would not be deemed an excuse for insurrection.

The General Convention met in New-York, where, it is understood, the Hon. Rufus King acted the same elevated part, which Mr. Dexter had discharged in Boston. The parricidal thought of disunion, was as vehemently denounced. The voice of genius and of integrity were not omnipotent. It seemed resolved that the administration should experience the full strength of its antagonists. Consequently the Governors of Massachusetts and of Connecticut withheld the constitutional quota of the Militia of their States, and pretended to argue seriously on the position—That at a period of war, or of any other exigency, should Congress order a detachment of militia into service to repel dangers rationally apprehended, compliance with the requisition is discretionary with the state-executives. Rhode-Island hesitated but obeyed. The executives of all the remaining twenty States and Territories, without regard to their private sentiments, with alacrity and cheerfulness, obeyed the requisition of their constituted authorities.

De Witt Clinton, notorious as a master-intriguer, but unthought of as a statesman, became an auxiliar to the opponents of government on the modest condition of being made "President of the United States." To reconcile all parties to his advancement, and to dispel suspicions on his apostacy, he averred to the republicans he was not a federalist—to the federalist, that he was not a republican. Each party assented to his declarations, and acknowledged it was easy to perceive what he was not, but who could ascertain what he was?

All the elements of faction were collected to blow up administration, with the wish of some, and indifference of others, that the nation itself should fall by the explosion. But the result covered the projectors with defeat and mortification. Spirited citizens of Massachusetts formed themselves into efficient corps, and volunteered their services to the President, willing to meet the duties of the constitutional quota. Thus the refusal of their Chief Magistrate was converted into an act of disgrace to himself, but not of embarrassment to the general government. James Madison was continued in the most exalted station in the gift of freemen as a recognition of past

merits; and a particular demonstration, that his character was enhanced, by recommending war in preference to submission. The coalition fell to atoms, and De Witt received the jeers instead of the huzzas of his old enemies. These events establish the truth—that the integrity and discernment in our national parties, exceed the ignorance and villany which infest them—that the American people are too intelligent, feel too wisely towards their country to render it the prey of faction, or victim of usurpation. From clouds which seemed pregnant with our destruction flashed this conviction to dismay our foes. Let administration then proceed vigorously—dread nothing but its own imbecility—Honor and support will be secured to itself, and the love and admiration of the citizens increased towards the union.

As Britain cannot induce us to conquer ourselves, our anxieties may cease as there is less cause to apprehend that we shall fall by her prowess, or warlike dexterity. Nations had been petrified at the gorgon aspect of her navy. America dissolved the spell and has restored hope to mankind. The fearless Hull astonished a despondent world with the first coruscation of that effulgent halo which beams around the republic. A braggart in the *Guerriere* had long insulted our shores. It was the fortune of the *Constitution* to meet him. In thirty minutes his decks were covered with the dead and expiring, his vessel shattered, his flag struck, and his presumption chastised. So little injured was our frigate that in a few moments she was prepared for another action, whilst her adversary could not be safely navigated, and was fit only for fuel—This was a proud day for America. New emotions elevated her drooping youth, who felt they were not longer doomed to writhe under mortification, and that nature had not created them for infamy and insignificance. The tone of joy yet echoed along the Alleghenies when the modest Jones met a vessel of superior force, the *Frolic*. After a slaughter the most awful he completely disabled her, and the imperious ensign dropped at the republican's feet. Scarce had the eagle enwreathed her second hero, when the noble Decatur blazed forth another "Pillar of Glory"—A frigate, a model in naval architecture, presented to the eyes of his countrymen the result of his valor. Patriots were yet musing on this resplendent achievement, when Bainbridge, the synonyme of magnanimity, encountered the elegant *Java*. She was rendered peculiarly formidable, by being crowded not only with seamen but with officers

of talents. These advantages however became nullities, and liberty beheld another trophied son. Lawrence, affiliated by sentiment, resolved to be united in deeds, with these peerless champions. After hunting danger in its recesses, he met an equal in force, the Peacock, and rivalled all which had been performed. Not only did he conquer, but he sank his enemy, in a space, which nothing but the known existence of the fact has made credible—killed and wounded the vast disproportion of 13 to 1. This tremendous repetition of defeats, astounded England's ministry. The people with consternation saw the walls of their security tremble, as it were by superhuman agency. Political legerdemain was necessary to preserve the public mind from despair. Commodore Broke, a brave and skilful commander, was therefore, directed by any means possible, to obtain an American frigate. A select crew, in a select ship, prepared, and for some time at sea, was favored with meeting the Chesapeake, immediately from port—with a crew collected in haste—and unknown to their officers—each (acknowledged by professional men) a circumstance calculated to diminish the equality of terms. The Chesapeake was lost, and Broke gained a name which he severely earned. Our naval character remained unobscured, and the fall of the brave was all we had to lament. In England universal illumination evidenced the terror with which the republic had shaken the despot of ocean. Humbled insolence sprang from the dust, and every hireling editor, and every besotted idiot displayed to the world the degrading extravagancies of an inebriated people. They were however soon recalled from their ecstasies: The Boxer, greater in dimensions, with more guns, if not with more men, emulous of the Shannon, invited the Enterprize to battle—The spirited Burrows engaged and fell. Lieutenant M'Call heroically prosecuted the conflict, captured his adversary, and is justly enranked with Lawrence and with Jones. A privateer of seven guns, the Decatur, worthy her appellation, was assailed by the Dominico of sixteen guns, a regular national ship. After a few broad-sides, the dauntless Diron darted along side, boarded, and added another to the brilliant triumphs of America. Our little Argus, after destroying property to immense amount in the British Channel, has been taken—but by a ship of superior force. That national inferiority did not occasion this incident, subsequent events have irresistibly demonstrated—A King's Packet, the Morgiana, of 18 guns, has become a prize to the valorous privateer Sara-

toga, who had at the time only 4 guns. On Lake Erie, a youth has won the laurels of the veteran Nelson. A British Fleet, superior in number of guns, and of men, and (which merits most consideration) composed of heavier vessels, has been shivered by a smaller American force—the first essay of juvenile skill.

Ontario has witnessed our luminous successes—Yeo, after being frequently chased, has lost part of his squadron, and the remaining part owe their existence to their sails and not to their guns. Chauncey has been as perfectly victorious over the British fleet, as was Commodore Truxton over the *La Vengeance*—A vanquished enemy has escaped.

Thus in frigates, sloops, and brigs, in private as well as public vessels, in single ships, and in fleets, Americans, have conquered Britons—What new mode of victory is requisite to establish our naval pre-eminence, it is difficult to conjecture.* England however is deplumed—the crown-feather of her arrogance has been plucked—That she will admit this glaring fact is neither probable nor necessary. The world sees it, and she feels it.

A navy comprises our wants. Possessing one we should lead Europe, and elicit her gratitude and applause for checking the common tyrant of every commercial and prospering people. Happily the acquisition is as easy, as the object is desirable. Seven millions of dollars added to the appropriations already made, would accomplish this great desideratum. Congress we trust, will order all their seasoned timber to be immediately converted into war-ships, and instantly procure a supply of materials adequate to build such a force as we shall require. More they cannot effect—less will be a reprehensible omission. High-spirited State Legislatures should present seventy-sixers and frigates as offerings of love to the altar of Union. Generous individuals should make the concern their own, and evince the enthusiasm which characterises freemen. American energy, patriotism, and activity, once roused—a navy bursts into existence under a magician's wand. You would drive Britain's squadrons from your coast, as your bird would shake a teasing insect from its wing. Let us then give our hearts and our hands to this work. Disappoint that subtle demon who would damp every fervid emotion—would annul every liberal exertion on behalf of our country. Our forests, our ship-wrights, our seamen rebuke this delay.

* Vide Appendix No. 1.

Joy and chagrine alternately affect us, as we advert to our military operations. Hull's giving into the hands of the enemy the first hope of his country—Winchester's bloody disaster, and the buffoonery of Smyth, were more than sufficient to arouse every emotion of indignation and despair. But at Queenstown we saw that discipline and able officers were our only wants; and the simultaneous effort of our Western brethren was an assurance, that a spirit existed, by which our fortune should be retrieved. At York, at Fort George, system, valor, competent knowledge were discovered. The glorious repulsion of detachments, in each instance more numerous, at Fort Meigs, Sackett's Harbor, at Fort Stephenson, could not have resulted from mere valor unaided by tactics. At the capture of Proctor's army, originality of mind was evinced in the mode of attack. Boerstler yielded when resistance would have been murderous temerity—and should late misfortunes deject us, let us remember it was after the gloomy occurrence on the Raisin, Croghan, Harrison and Pike, became conspicuous.

Doubts on our eventual success, can arise only from ignorance of the American character, or poverty of reflection. They who bear arms for us, are but from the plough; and intuition only, could already have converted them into regulars. As much has been effected as could rationally have been expected from men who have not yet put off the citizen. To appreciate their improvement, Boerstler's surrender should be compared with Hull's—the battle of York with the battle of Queenstown—the acquisition in Upper Canada with the loss of Michigan. There has not been an engagement from that of Brownstown to this period, in which, some one before unknown, has not attained the most splendid celebrity.

But it is the character of our population, and not what has been done, which furnishes a datum, justifying the most confident and exhilarating calculations. A people, hardy in sustaining the rigors of climate—mindless of the fatigues of martial life—delighting in enterprise, because habituated to surmount difficulties—inaccessible to fear—whose peculiar trait is susceptibility of instruction—and who have never been unmoved at the afflictions of their country, nor ever heard of its felicities without transport. Substantial then, are the materials of which our force will be constructed. An army of perfectly disciplined Kentuckians, would present as elevating and commanding a band, as Scipio ever contemplated, or Miltiades ever led.

in the cause of liberty. Such an army we shall have. Congress with their constituents are excited, and have demonstrated a steady resolve. As we proceed, we shall ascertain for what station nature intended the various individuals to whom commissions have been granted. Time will disclose incapacity and corruption, and start to view talents and fidelity. Let us then with alacrity perform for the Republic, whatever our station may admit, of its government direct. There is every cause to hope, none to despond. Time will right all things for us.

A review of our history, naval and military, presages that all will ensue, which genius, skill, and public virtue can accomplish. Should we be cursed with an administration so timid or so traitorous, as to relinquish or abate our rights, it may animate to efforts which would coerce redress to know, that the baseness of our representatives, and not the inefficiency of national means, will have occasioned our degradation. Great as were our ancestors, the present generation have proved themselves worthy their descent; and if they in whom we confide will equally feel the spirit of their constituents, as did the Congress of '76, equal glories will be added to the American name. Justly to estimate our present ability, let us compare the state of our country at the Revolution, when she discomfited the same oppressor, with her present circumstances. From the best documents it must

be admitted, that our population at that period was considerably below three millions. Governor Pownall, whose investigation was ample, and whose opinion has frequently been recognised as correct, computed it, anno 1774, at 2,141,307. To allow the amount of 2,500,000, will therefore be liberal. The census of 1810 gave the United States, a population of 7,238,421—the common annual increase must have propelled it much beyond eight millions. Such therefore is the prodigious accession to our physical means.

Excluding toriès and negroes, it will appear that the militia (that is, whigs capable and disposed to fight for freedom) did not exceed three hundred and fifty thousand. Enlightened statesmen, Dr. Franklin and Mr. Penn, in their examination before the house of commons, supposed about three hundred thousand. We have at present six millions of whites. Of these half are males, the majority of which are above the age of sev-

enteen, and able to bear arms. Our present militia force may hence be computed at a million and a half.

A few foundaries for cannon, with a few rude manufactories, and provision, were the whole of our military conveniences at that period. Powder, ball, muskets, *Military supplies.* clothing, with every other description of military requisite, were partially supplied by the enterprize of cruisers, and by foreign assistance. Battles were lost, advantages abandoned, merely through a deficiency in the munitions of war. According to the authentic report of a committee in Congress, we had even in 1812, two hundred and seven powder-mills, and numbers establishing every year—530 forges and bloomeries. Such perfection has the boring of cannon reached, that of two thousand examined, not one was condemned. Numerous factories for small arms exist, and this may be increased to any demand. The one at Harper's ferry, has produced thirty thousand stand in a year. Against similar embarrassments, we are therefore secured. Clothing, our domestic manufacturers are offering in superabundance. With our provisions, we sustain not only our own army and people, but the armies and people of both friends and enemies in every section of the globe. These facts will defend the assertion, that the American Republic, with little effort, can feed, arm, and clothe five hundred thousand men, if demanded by national emergency. With these *real* means, can we not support 50,000, when it is remembered that our fathers sustained 46,000 with means virtually * nominal?

Competent authority states the number of our seamen at that epoch, as not more than sixteen thousand. Ex-
 ertion raised a pigmy fleet of thirteen frigates rating from 24 to 32 guns. But individual activity *Maritime force.* in union with this little force, vexed, shattered British commerce, disgraced British omnipotence, and evinced, that the energy and terrors of Hercules might be the attributes of a dwarf. "The American privateers, says Dr. Ramsay, in the year 1777, increased in numbers and in boldness. They insulted the coasts of Great Britain and Ireland, in a manner, that had *never* before been attempted. Such was their spirit of enterprise, that it became necessary to appoint a convoy for the protection of the linen-ships from Dublin to Newry."

Nothing but historic evidence could establish the belief, that a people not yet formed into a nation, could be more terrible to the maritime omnipotence of England than France and Spain together. Such is the undisputed testimony of history. "A few small cruizers were fitted out by public authority, says Chief-Justice Marshall, and the coasts soon swarmed with the privateers of New-England. These naval exertions were attended with the most valuable consequences. The enemy who seem to have been under *no* apprehension of an attack on what was deemed *their peculiar* element, *smarted* very severely under these *first essays* of the colonists in maritime war. It has been stated by persons conversant with the subject, that the captures made by the cruizers belonging to Massachusetts alone, exceed those made by France and Spain in any one year of the war which ended in 1763." It would seem the historians of the Revolution were narrating the events of the present times. France and Spain have been again surpassed. Goliath, again, has been levelled by the stripling. Upwards of seven hundred of her ships have been captured in eighteen months, her coasts vexed, her reputation prostrated, and the death-blow given to her future presumptuous despotism. With triple the number of privateers, we have now, including those building and repairing, with those ready for sea, 3 sail of the line rating 76 guns, 14 frigates from 32 to 44 guns, 8 sloops, besides the smaller sized vessels, and the ability of augmenting to any desirable amount. One hundred and thirty thousand seamen are prepared to shew their allegiance to our government, and avenge their own wrongs. An augmentation so immense may appear incredible, when our population is only treble its amount in '76. But seamen are proportioned to commerce, and the increase of our commerce equals the increase of seamen affirmed.

To procure pecuniary aid, our ancestors could offer only the industry of less than three millions of people, and about 200,000,000 of acres of vacant land. The value of their exports had never exceeded twelve millions of dollars. Before the probable effect of their industry could be conjectured, it was to be determined whether free, durable governments, would spring from the distractions of the country, and secure to labor its rewards: or whether despotism, the common offspring of revolutions, would not be the result of our domestic convulsions. Chance was to realize the dreams of the commercial ad-

venturer: View the portentous glooms of '87—consider the universal maritime depredations, and the most dejecting apprehensions will not appear irrational. To have expected the magic wonders which our Republic now exhibits, would have been pronounced the chimera of a political maniac. Yet pecuniary aid was obtained.

We can, now, offer the industry of eight millions of people who double their numbers in 25 years, and in the same short term, multiply their pecuniary resources to five times their amount. Providence, as though to further our destinies, has given a new territory, Louisiana, which contains an empire of vacant land. Besides this golden acquisition, there remain unsold two hundred millions of acres in the Western, N. W. and southern country. Louisiana it has been generally supposed contained about one million of square miles, 640 millions acres. Not above a sixth is settled or purchased, wherefore there would remain to the government 500,000,000 acres. It has been said, however that our government does not own much more than two hundred millions of acres within its limits. Admit this. Experience forbids us to value our territories below two dollars an acre. Hence by the lowest calculation we can mortgage land to the amount of eight hundred millions of dollars—besides our other resources. A more rapid development of our other resources may be expected than has yet occurred. The industry of our nation has never fully expanded. We have never yet known an absolutely free trade—for that are we now contending—Under its prolific influence what harvests of wealth shall be deemed exuberant? Let the past decide what may be well-founded anticipations. The value of our exports in the year 1790 was \$16,000,000 in '94 it was 33,000,000, double in four years, in '99 it was \$78,665,522, double and a third more in 5 years. In 1807 it was \$108,343,558, an increase of about thirty millions in eight years. Thus is the fact recorded, that in less than eighteen years the resources of the republic may become sevenfold—Who then but an idiot or a traitor will prattle about the pecuniary impotence of the United States?

The following statements of Charles Jared Ingersoll Esq. (representative of the opulent and enlightened city and county of Philadelphia) are a severe satire on the opinion that our government is without credit. Among the subscribers to the loans are the Hon: Wm. Gray of Salem, the wealthiest merchant in New England,—Mr. Astor equally conspicuous in New York, Mr. Girard in Phila-

delphia, the most affluent in the whole United States, and yielding to none in personal worth, or universal respectability—the first capitalist in Baltimore—and Mr. John Potter, whose riches place him among the first, and whose individual merit has elicited the general esteem of his fellow citizens in Charleston. Now each of these subscribers is a man, attached to the republic, and has all his fortune involved in her destinies. Is it among such characters you would find abettors of ^{our} war, of ambition, and of ruin?

Mr. Ingersoll. “That honorable gentleman has the honor to represent on that floor some portion of the great state of New York, unquestionably *the first* in the union; an acknowledgement I must needs make, though I have the honor to represent in part a state which claims *at least a secondary* rank. He will permit me to assure him that the principal contributor to the late loan is a gentleman, who within the last four years, has invested upwards of *five hundred thousand dollars* in the soil of New York or the banks of the St. Lawrence, and who therefore feels probably as deep an interest in this country, as, perhaps, the honorable gentleman himself. What the politics of the gentleman alluded to are, I declare I do not know, though I enjoy the pleasure of his acquaintance; and I much doubt whether he has thought it necessary to adopt any. But together with his great opulence he has certainly always been distinguished for the goodness of his heart, the integrity and liberality of his nature, the hospitality of his house, and his peculiar talent to perceive when, how, and *where* to appropriate his large funds to the *best advantage*.”

2. Another of the principal contributors to the loan is a fellow-townsmen of mine, who by thirty years of undefatigable and prosperous attention to mercantile business, is generally supposed to have amassed a solid fortune of at least *two millions* of dollars; and who upon the dissolution of the charter of the late bank of the U. States, was affluent enough to purchase the edifice belonging to that institution, together, I believe, with most of the specie in their vaults, and to continue on the foundation, distributing the discounts, and pecuniary benefits of such an extensive establishment to the commercial community—a citizen, who some years ago, when Philadelphia was afflicted by a pestilence, and all those inhabitants fled away from the scene of desolation who had the means of escape, staid behind, not to watch his treasure, not to count his gold, but to plunge into the infection of hospitals,” to survey the mansions of sorrow and pain,

to remember the forgotten, to attend to the neglected, to visit the forsaken, and I will add, as I believe I may with strict propriety, to administer even the rites of sepulture to those who had not a friend left with them for the performance of such sad ceremonies. This gentleman, I can assure the honorable member from New-York, is no delinquent partizan of his—but for thirty years has always been a firm, though unmeddling, and resolute and consistent republican.

3. A third of the chief contributors to the late loan is, as I have generally understood, one of the greatest capitalists of the city of New-York; as little deserving the aspersions of the honorable gentleman from that State; since he too, unless I am much mistaken, belongs to that class of Americans who do not fall in with the political exclusiveness of that honorable gentleman, who has so boldly laid claim (I am endeavoring to shew *with what justice*) to all the capitals, as well as all the virtue, and of course all the talents of the community.

4. A fourth of these upbraided delinquents is an inhabitant of Salem or Boston, though I am not certain whether he had an opportunity of coming in for a share of the loan of 1813, but who, at all events, I believe, subscribed most liberally to that of 1812; and who, far from meriting the distorted and wholly unfounded crimination of the honorable gentleman, is like the others I have exculpated—a citizen at the same time of immense wealth and sterling republicanism.

5. There was, I think, a fifth large subscriber, a rich and respectable merchant of Baltimore, who is, I am informed, of the political denomination of those with whom the honorable gentleman from New-York acts; but who, it gives me pleasure to add, I have always considered, instead of a delinquent, rather a high-toned partizan. But nevertheless, a man amiable in his manners and character, and entirely exempt from any of the faults imputed by the sweeping invective of the honorable gentleman from New-York.

6. Mr. Jacob Gerard Koch, a citizen of Philadelphia, subscribed five hundred thousand dollars to the first loan, and paid his subscription in two checks for that large amount. This considerable sum was subscribed at a moment when the most unwarrantable efforts were making to depress the credit of government. It was subscribed by the gentleman in question from the noblest motives—a *determination to support the administration*, of whose measures he approves, in a just war which he deemed inevitable;—and it is well known that

six per cent. was the interest payable, and no more, on the first loan to which he thus largely and generously contributed."

Hence the first citizens in the Union, first, not only in opulence but in every quality which dignifies the human character, will uphold the present national measure. If fact establishes assertion, the wealth of the country has sided with administration.

How far European nations would countenance their struggle was was a doubtful calculation with the weak colonists. That they wished the dismemberment of Britain was certain. But

Foreign aid. having been already overpowered, not yet recovered, from the shock, they cautiously would avoid drawing untimely afflictions upon themselves. France, Spain, and Holland were therefore tardily led into opposition with our enemy. The other continental nations were neither disposed nor capable of rendering us nominal benefit—How infinite are the present advantages of the powerful states, when foreign aid is less important. The resources of France, of Holland, Italy, a portion of Germany, of Denmark are applied to vanquish our enemy, by a genius fortune seems to have incited to super-human achievements, by prospering the wildest enterprises of his heaven-towering ambition. For a time he seems devoted—But let us not forget, it is from the ashes of apparent destruction arises the renovated Phœnix.

The other sections of Europe present a free and improved trade, and desire those principles to prevail which we advocate. Britain they feel is the tyrant of commerce—hence they are, and will continue unsolicitous of debilitating America who is the champion of commerce. We may foresee, a French fleet upon our coast, without suspecting Bonaparte of love towards the republic. The double motive of striking the West-Indies, and sending his seamen to the school of Hull and Perry, ensures his aid better than his disinterested benig- nity.

Not only had the provinces to breast England's power, but an internal enemy perpetually corroded their nerves, and threatened them with imbecility. A natural dread of opposing the an-
Disaffected. cient authority, led many to uphold it, however its in- fictions may have been experienced. Immense armies overspreading the territory, with the imposing aspect of restoring the sovereign to his rightful possessions—offering gold to the corruptible, terror to the timid, freedom and security to those in bon-

dage, left to the cause of liberty but the principled and intrepid. Shall we then say that less than one fourth were enemies of the revolution.

These dangers are passed forever. We are aware that a population confined to the southern states is viewed as a gathering cloud, too awful to be approached even for examination. Now it should be approached, because upon examination, it will be found—that the designing have conjured a medium by which an harmless object has been loomed into a terrific spectre. That our blacks have been *used* to appal us, may be deduced from a few considerations. There is and can be no army in our country to support them, hence they must be the victims of infatuated desperation.—They are the happiest slaves in the world, their situation is daily improving, and nothing but their own misconduct can arrest its continual amelioration. They are generally attached to their masters, and evinced their fidelity in '76. The difference between the comforts enjoyed by the free population of color, and the whites, is not perceptible. They dress as well, have equal security of property, and every liberal indulgence. Many possess extensive wealth. Were Britain's manufacturers as comfortable as the negroes of Charleston, we should hear of fewer insurrections for bread—Instances exist of slaves who purchased the emancipation of their relatives, but preferred themselves remaining with their owners, because they enjoyed the blessings and were relieved from the cares of freedom. What can they propose to themselves by an impotent unprovoked struggle, but punishment and ruin?—Besides, the negroes despise the British. When their banditti-army retreated from Stono, negroes who had been deluded by them attempted to leap into their boats to escape with them; English soldiers stationed for the purpose, chopped off their hands, and left them to the mercy of the Americans—When Charleston was evacuated, hundreds of these unfortunate beings were deserted on the commons, dead and dying in the most inhuman condition—others, seduced by the proffer of liberty, were sold as legal prizes in the West Indies. These acts of cruel perfidy have enkindled no inextinguishable predilection for the reputed bulwark of Christendom. Britain should beware of retributory horrors in her sugar islands. Jamaica has 250,000 blacks, and only 30,000 whites. The disproportion in the other Islands is equally excessive. This evil then is unreal.

Toryism is another bug-bear. There doubtless exists a malignant remnant of reprieved felons, condemned by the justice, and par-

done by the mercy of our ancestors, who can never forget the degradation of having passed under the gallows. With British emissaries we are beset. But the majority of the old royalists, with other adherents to our enemy, if not urged by gratitude, must see the prudence of not resisting the government. Their treason will evaporate in seditious vociferation—but they dare not either join our foes, or withhold their quota of duty. They know that their all will be risked, and nothing gained. All the disaffected, negroes, tories, and traitors cannot be five hundred thousand—one sixteenth. Not only are they numerically less, but want of opportunity for acting has made them a nullity.

In contemplating the traits of our revolution, less astonishment is excited by the ruinous effects of war, than their being survived by the people. The whole country was devastated, internal improve-

Effects of the War. ments arrested or destroyed, government annihilated, vice and licentiousness fomented and universally extended—At present, the sea-coast has been a little infested, our foreign commerce obstructed. That future distresses will exceed what we have already experienced, is improbable. Their conduct in Virginia demonstrates the limits of their enterprise, as well as the boundlessness of their desperation and malignity—Internal improvements progressing with the most triumphant celerity—our free government rising to perfection under this new experiment—our citizens depending on each other, domesticating their feelings, and disencumbering themselves of their dangerous, humiliating foreign partialities—constitute an aggregate of blessings which sink to insignificance the probable evils of this contest.

A Comparison of the resources and condition of America during the Revolution, with her Present Situation and ability.

DURING THE REVOLUTION.

AT PRESENT.

Population,	2,500,000.	Population,	8,000,000.
Militia,	350,000.	Militia,	1,500,000.
Military supplies—A few founda- ries for cannon—a few small arms—a little clothing, and provisions.		Military Supplies.—530 forges, foundaries and bloomeries— 207 powder mills—small arms, clothing, provision, with every other possible requisite for an army superabundant.	
Maritime force—Seamen 16,000 Privateers—Numerous.		Maritime force—Seamen 130,000 Privateers—Triple in number.	
Navy—13 little frigates, rat- ing from 24 to 32 guns, with smaller vessels.		Navy—4 sail of the line rating 76 guns, 14 frigates from 32 to 44, with smaller ves- sels.	
Foundation of Credit—Industry of 2,500,000 people.		Foundation of Credit—Industry of 8,000,000 people.	
Vacant Land—about two hun- dred millions of acres.		Vacant Land—certainly four hundred millions of acres— perhaps 700,000,000.	
Value of Exports—12 millions of dollars.		Value of Exports—103 mil- lions of dollars.	
Army supported—46,800 men.		Army to be supported—50,000 men.	
Foreign Aid—France, Spain, Hol- land—other powers useless.		Foreign Aid—France, Holland, Italy, Denmark; all made dou- bly powerful by the genius of Bonaparte. Other nations af- fording valuable Commerce, and wishing us success.	
Disaffected—One fourth.		Disaffected—One sixteenth.	
Effects of War—The whole coun- try devastated—internal im- provement destroyed—govern- ment annihilated.		Effects of War—Sea-coast a little infested—Internal Improve- ment incredibly accelerated —government perfecting.	

There is another view in which the present generation will have the "vantage ground" of their immortal ancestors, which should not be omitted. At the close of the revolution, all the machinery of national industry was broken up. Shut out from their old channels of commerce, our merchants had new sources of trade to explore; and the capital was yet to be created to render their discoveries useful. The seven years of invasion were not more distressing than the first seven years which succeeded the peace. At present the wheel of foreign commerce is obstructed and moves heavily; but all the internal part of the machine—our domestic trade, is enlarged, improved, and works in a style which promises to remunerate our sacrifices, and to surpass the hopes of the most sanguine patriotism. Our foreign connexions and internal government, are so firmly settled, that the first year of peace will give as much commerce as we ever enjoyed. There will be no derangement. "When the British left Philadelphia, says an American writer, one solitary ferry-boat was all that was left to swim on the waters of the majestic Delaware; yet soon after, when we came from St. Augustine, we met nearly forty sail of vessels in the river, manned and armed, going out, mostly new ships that had never been to sea." Let that fact teach us the recuperative energy of America, and dispel the doubt, that we cannot immediately recover from the worst calamities this contest can inflict,

Such were the diminutive means with which America once determined to oppose Britain. Was she unwise? Did the utmost efforts of her vindictive adversary succeed? The lamentation of an English historian is the best comment on the prescience of our paternal councils. Thus he moans—"All the profuse expenditure of British wealth, all the mighty efforts of British power, all the splendid achievements of British valor, directed and guided by British talents and skill, proved without effect—The momentous exertions of a war so wasteful of blood and treasure, were forever lost." (*Bisset.*) Vainly, indeed, has heaven fostered our country to its present magnitude, if we dread attempting now, what was accomplished in its infancy.

Our rights are yet withheld. Britain announces that her fiat shall be the law of nations. Our merchants property is yet to be confiscated, for entering free ports which she impotently declares blockaded. The American seaman is to be again consigned to contumely

and servitude, at the caprice of ruffian press-gangs. Tyrannic outrage! Shall we submit? Are our fathers dead—or are we degenerate? No! Eternal war, and not submissive peace. **WAR IS AN EVIL—BUT WAR WITH BRITAIN IS A POLITICAL BLESSING TO AMERICA.** Let the question be temperately considered. Will a durable British war produce most injury or benefit to the United States?—It may be a deception of vision, but (to me) there appear, besides lesser felicitous effects, five definite advantages—advantages inestimable to our security—independence; permanent integrity, to our increasing happiness, opulence and splendor—germinating and about evolving from this contest. These are, commercial independence—a navy—expulsion from our neighbourhood of a restless, subtle, dangerous enemy—union—a lofty national character.

Britain is too much the Europe of America, was the remark of that deep-sighted Frenchman, Talleyrand. The following alarming passage from the enlightened Pinkerton, invites the reflection of every patriot. “The Americans broke their colonial bonds,” says he, “but could not overcome their *commercial*, which must bind them to the parent- *Commercial Independence.* state for some generations, if they do not even *destroy* their vaunted *independence.*” That British commerce was secretly undermining the citadel of our freedom—that we were certainly, though insensibly falling into colonial vassalage, was an opinion long advocated by intelligent republicans, though denounced by some as futile and jacobinical. One of the most well-informed sages that ever edified mankind, seriously concludes, from a temperate survey of our foreign trade, that British commercial bonds would destroy our independence. But from this calamity, embargo and war have been our deliverers. Manufactures, with their attendant arts, are established. Time will mature their growth—but they already flourish with a vigor which defies contingency. In the year 1807, there were but fifteen cotton-mills in the United States; in 1809, there were eighty-seven.

A number of zealous patriots in Baltimore, associated, under the name of the Athenæan Society, to encourage the use of domestic manufactures. The progressive increase of their sales, evinces the progress of manufactures. In 1809 they sold to the amount only of \$17,608—in 1810 their sales increased to \$32,137—in 1811 to \$1,519

and in 1812 to \$80,893. In and about the same city there was not a thread made three years ago—there are now 12 thousands spindles in operation—and these are considered merely as a commencement, a specimen of what is to be effected. Next to the spirit of liberty, the spirit of domestic manufactures predominates with the people—there seems one immovable resolve, that American activity and ingenuity, shall give America an exuberance of every necessary comfort, and elegant luxury of civilized life. Our commerce, whose golden deposit enriched the empire of Britain only, is entering new and capacious channels, prepared by other nations, anxious of partaking its beneficent qualities. The sugar-cane grows luxuriously in our southern districts. France deprived of her islands, offers an insatiable, market for this new staple. Thus shall we be ensured of certain vents for all our productions. Were obstructions eternized against intercourse with our present enemy, there would be no cause of regret; there would rather be much of felicitation; as we should then see the annihilation of that deleterious monopoly, which was to have destroyed our “vaunted independence.”

The heroes of the ocean have inflamed Americans with the most irresistible enthusiasm towards a navy. The national spirit was broken. They have humbled the hectoring oppressor, and
A Navy. reared the Republic's crest. Gratitude must guard the establishment. The public seaman will no longer be viewed as an expensive idler, but contemplated with a devotion more suitable to a celestial avenger. The chilling doctrine is instilled, that we must remain impotent against the mistress of Neptune. Why? Have we not half as many seamen? Are they not equal in skill and intrepidity? Are not her East and West Indies situated more favorably to be attacked by us than defended by her? These are not dubious truths—how then is she invulnerable?—Only by the inactivity of Americans—But a navy will be built—There is a most auspicious temper manifested—a temper created solely by the events of this war. The splendid eloquence, and full demonstrations of Mr. Cheves and all the brilliant talents in co-operation, could barely procure an unimportant appropriation. Immediately after the illustrious achievements which preceded their next session, Congress doubled the force: This temper will lead to greater acts. Hostilities must terminate speedily, or an American navy commands the adjacent seas. There are in commission, building, and to be built 4 sail of

the line, 18 frigates, 8 sloops of war. According to the extensive enquiries of the naval committee, 11 of the line, 7 frigates, 17 sloops, besides those already ordered, would be fully adequate. The smaller force is not mentioned, as the cheapness and speed with which they may be obtained, render them an item which cannot affect calculations on this subject. By consulting the official estimate below, it will be seen that this increase will not cost more than seven millions of dollars. The mere building would not occupy our artizans more than a twelve-month. Ships of the line may be completed in a year, frigates in nine months, sloops in five. There was a French 74 in the fleet which engaged Admiral Kempenfelt, which was built, launched, rigged, and stored in ninety-five days, at Brest. In 1811, there were 146,000 tons built in the United States—whereas the proposed addition would not exceed 42,000 tons. By “the proposed addition,” we mean all the vessels required, but not yet commenced, which are as follow—

	<i>Tons.</i>	<i>Ships.</i>	<i>Tons.</i>
Ships of the Line, averaging	1,620	$\times 12 =$	19,440
Frigates, averaging	1,200	$\times 11 =$	13,200
Sloops of War, averaging	510	$\times 17 =$	8,670
			<hr/>
Total Tons,			41,310

Merchantmen consume about half the timber which ships of war of equal tonnage do, and therefore require about half the time for their construction.

There are many places at which a fleet of any dimensions may be built, in defiance of blockading squadrons. Beaufort, in South-Carolina, commands the resources of the two Carolinas, Georgia, the Floridas—the depth of water in its harbor would admit the first rates in any number; and it can be sufficiently fortified. There are doubtless other stations, equally eligible in the more northern states. The only difficulty like an impediment, is the want of timber properly seasoned. Even this is temporary. Abundance may be immediately felled, and in eighteen months would be fit for use. Thus it is in our power to have, in two or three years, 15 seventy-sixers, 25 frigates, 25 sloops of war, with the usual accompaniment of smaller vessels—a force “inestimable to freemen, and formidable to tyrants only.” Our domestic intercourse would then be secure, our foreign

trade augmented by being less endangered--the delapidation of maritime despotism accelerated.*

The Secretary of the Navy, Paul Hamilton, Esq. made the following confirmatory statements in his communication to the Naval Committee--

"Supposing a continuance of the present state of things in Europe," says the Secretary, "and that the United States should come into collision with either of the present great belligerents, a naval force of twelve sail of the line (74's) and twenty well-constructed frigates, including those we now have, and rating not less than 38 guns, with the addition of our smaller vessels now in service, judiciously directed, it is believed, would be *ample*, to the protection of our coasting trade--would be competent to annoy extensively the commerce of an enemy, and uniting occasionally in operations with the gun-boats already built, if equipped and brought into service, and our fortifications, also afford complete protection to our harbors."

Estimate of the Expense of Building and completely Equipping for actual service, Vessels of War of various Rates; and the Annual Expense of each.

<i>Rates.</i>	<i>Expense of Building.</i>	<i>Annual Expense.</i>
<i>Guns.</i>	<i>Dollars.</i>	<i>Dollars.</i>
74	333,000	211,784
60	270,000	140,000
50	225,000	115,000
44	198,000	110,000
36	162,000	102,000
32	128,000	82,000
20	70,000	50,202

The expulsion from our neighbourhood of a dangerous, intriguing, malignant enemy, will ensue. The conquest of the British possessions on our continent must result from a durable war. The time requisite for it's accomplishment rests on contingency--the ability to effect it, would outrage common discernment to litigate. Our military force is daily improving in discipline, our men are not only more abundant, but a nobler race than those who constitute an European army. Were they unequal in tactics, numbers would supply

* Vide Appendix, No. III.

the deficiency of skill. It will be more important to examine the worth of our probable acquisitions. They would be valuable as strong posts of self-defence—as giving a monitory blow to an imperious enemy—as an accession of future wealth and population—as wresting from Britain means of annoyance peculiar to her. All the afflictions and desolation which have visited our frontiers will be repeated whilst Britain has access to the savages. Her provinces are the only way through which she can influence them. Retain these, and Indian massacres are ended forever, as the great cause, foreign instigation, will be removed. That the savages would then be peaceful, may be inferred, from the conduct of the Cherokees, and other tribes which we have subjugated. Halifax facilitates hostile operations against our commerce, and our maritime citizens. Occupied by the United States, not only a smaller navy would be adequate to our purposes, but a commanding station obtained to frustrate inimical schemes against our cities, and invaluable fisheries. Dispossessed of every resting-place on our continent, European powers can hope nothing from military expeditions against us, and future conflicts will be confined to the ocean. Hence as strong posts of domestic security, the British provinces should be procured how great soever the expense.

*Expulsion afar of
a dangerous foe.*

A further motive should urge us to wrest from Britain, and retain her neighbouring territories. Why are we at war? Why is the farmer not at his fire-side? Why are a people too fond of peace, coerced to change the comforts of tranquility for the hardships and uncongenial occupations of martial life? Why is Arcadia converted into a camp?—Because we were compelled to determine which we would relinquish, our ease, or our freedom. Because a pacific temper was mistaken for pusillanimity, and Britain hoped to despoil us of property and reputation with equal impunity. Do you wish your children to be exempt from the insults and calamities with which their fathers have been assailed? Then let the world see, that the American principle is, neither to injure nor acquiesce under injury. These provinces are important to England. They sustain almost the existence of her West-Indies—aid very much her naval establishment, and are an increasing granary to a population often famishing. To restore them would be too silly an act, it is hoped, to disgrace our councils. The blood, the expenditure of the country, private

misfortune, and public mortification, will have eventuated in what? In demonstrating the triumph of our enemy—and we shall be left as weak dupes for the world to laugh at. What motive of gratitude could then attach our western brethren to the general government? They left their homes, bore the rigors of Canadian winters, exposed their existence, saw their friends fall and expire, all to avenge and uphold their country. Their country, cold to their actions, so far from protecting them, lets in the murderers to slaughter their wives, their children, and destroy every endearment. Then indeed would Britain exultingly display the double honors of the cabinet and the field. Were there no other inducement, the suffering and noble deeds of Kentucky alone should decide against it. Then if once acquired, let them never be surrendered. Other nations will be thereby admonished, that our people are patient, but not passive—and Britain will not again wantonly trample the American Eagle, as she will have learnt that his beak is pointed, his talons not powerless.

But the future importance of these possessions should repel all frigid calculations on their being obtained at an extravagant expenditure. Because inferior to the United States they are pronounced worthless. Reflection will disperse this illusion so favorable to the views of our enemy. They are valuable notwithstanding their comparative insignificance. The vast amount of vacant land would add to the resources of our government, whilst the fur-trade and the fisheries would present to our citizens new fields of activity and of opulence. Within the dimensions of these territories, will grow up a nation of, at least, ten millions of people. Upper Canada alone, contains more and richer land than twice the amount of what is comprised in Britain's little Island. From the number of inhabitants which belong to the latter, may be deduced the possible number which favorable circumstances may give to Canada. But to be more definite. The British provinces are greater in extent, have soil of a superior quality, and are blessed with a more salubrious climate than Denmark, Sweden, and those fifteen districts of Russia, denominated the "Northern Region." Now fifteen millions of human beings subsist within this portion of Europe. But moral and political causes augment the strength and riches of an empire, far beyond physical causes. Without meriting animadversion, it may be asserted, that the American government and habits are more conducive to wealth and population than the governments and habits in the North

of Europe—Wherefore we infer, that the present British provinces under an American government, would exceed Denmark, Sweden, and the Northern Region of Russia, in population and wealth—because more favored by moral, political, and physical causes. The same character of enterprise, of successful industry, and intelligence, which distinguished the United States, will be acquired by the future citizens of these provinces. Hence the future value of these provinces cannot be far below the present value of the United States. Our treasury would be refunded by its riches, our losses repaired by its numbers. The principles of mercantile speculation, justify the subjugation of these dominions. Not only would the costs of conquest be refunded, but an immense revenue ensured. Their population has doubled, and their commerce quadrupled since our revolution—nor can we suppose their future increase will be languid. Ten millions of Americans settled in them, would demonstrate, that the day which made them ours, formed as bright an epoch as emblazons the annals of any country.

Is it irrational to expect that these territories may become a nation of this magnitude? If it be not, can we meditate without inquietude on the political evils, of which it may be eminently instrumental, as the vanguard of Britain? Armies and navies may not only be supplied, but created. Here every military establishment can and will be located to annoy the western world. Here treason is offered a refuge, and will ever find abettors. Is England so philanthropic that internal peace ensues from her proximity? Why do some of our citizens shudder at the possibility that France may possess, and yet desire that Britain should retain them? In what trait the cabinet of France is more atrocious than that of Britain history has not decided. The ambition of both is equally odious and the blood and misery of man distain equally the track of each—The integrity of our empire is as insecure whilst Britain holds these possessions as was the integrity of France when she held Calais. The same consideration which occasioned her expulsion from the one, should also occasion it from the other—not the pecuniary value of the soil, but the danger of allowing an enemy a foot-hold in your country.

The retention, it is supposed, would be difficult. This fear, we trust, is causeless—Foreign attacks may be repelled as easily as from our present dominions, and less internal hostility will exist than is

apprehended. A late and intelligent traveller, Mr. Mellish, informs us, that the Canadians *feel* the imposition of a haughty, voracious aristocracy who monopolize their wealth and honors. The American government by equalising the rights would be entwined with the affections of the people.—A predilection for our country exists. Many of our citizens yielding to their convenience have become settlers, but cannot be averse from their own family. The readiness with which Hull's standard was surrounded evidences, that our success is not generally deprecated. By a change of allegiance their commercial situation would not deteriorate—With their new brethren they would share the domestic trade of the United States, and should Britain lose these dominions, policy will dictate liberality in her future arrangements with us. Our ability to retain these territories cannot be questioned, when we reflect that Britain reins impatient Ireland whose numbers equal one fourth of her population,—whereas the numbers in these provinces do not exceed an eighteenth of what we possess—Besides all British subjects in these colonies, cannot be inconscious that every American war subjects them to invasion—an evil always afflictive, and which can be remedied only by breaking the trammels that hang them to an European owner.

The present is our time for accomplishing this object—Whilst their number is small, their incorporation will be easy, their resistance trivial. Time will only accumulate obstructions. Whatever antipathies some of this generation may cherish, their children will feel, and conduct themselves as American citizens. Such has been the fact with the old royalists, many of whose descendants have fully expiated the offence of their fathers. Let us then anticipate, that once acquired by arms, they will never be abandoned by negotiation—It would be as insane, as if our ancestors had repealed the act of independence, when parliament abolished its obnoxious measures, resting their happiness on British honesty. Our own arm must be our reliance, and when that fails, only the mercy of heaven can save us from chains. Wherefore let us not forego the hope that the expulsion from our neighbourhood of a turbulent, malignant, active foe may *fest* the recollection of our present struggle—that the republican may yet, with holy transport, contemplate the Columbian laurel extending its triumphal branches over the sacred earth where rest his Pike and his Montgomery.

This war is interweaving the states into one nation. The prodigious manufacturing establishments of the north already effected with those progressing, guarantee to the southern *Union*. section of the Republic a superabundance of every comfort heretofore derived from Europe. The condition too is as unobjectionable as delightful—that we should give our money to our own countrymen and not to our adversaries. The supply will be exuberant, the articles better, the price more moderate. Cheapness & superior clothing will be substituted for refuse cloth and usurious charges. This recommendation, with a market for his crop, liberal, certain and daily increasing, will bind the planter by a new *nexus* to his northern brother. Internal dependance & external independence (that first prayer of the patriot) will be the consequence. Thus America, like a contented family, happy within its own domicile, will not be wandering abroad for enjoyment. The energy of the constitution has, also been tested, its defects fully exhibited; & its latent virtues forced into action and displayed to our view. Its enemies have been compelled to admire what they could not overthrow.—Not only perfect freedom, but the most abandoned profligacy of speech and of action have proved innocuous. The gusts of faction have passed in noisy impotence. The grand experiment for man has succeeded. The world has witnessed the demonstration that a pure Republican government ^{can} exist—that the most absolute indulgence of the liberty of thought and expression—the most complete equalization of human rights do not incapacitate a nation for repressing sedition, or vanquishing the most formidable foreign antagonist. The grateful evidence of this truth has endeared the union. Our citizens have discerned that it is worthy their care—that its imperfections are few, and reparable.

Further. The benefits of union have been fully discussed. Every illusory advantage that the worst heart and deepest mind could suggest against it, has been presented, and minutely examined. The examination has ended in the happy conviction—that the cruelest imprecations of the most deadly enmity are summed in the single wish, that—we should be disunited. Every American is now aware, that union is odious only to those political vultures who wait its dissolution with the hope of preying on its dissevered members—Investigation has vivified, what it was designed to render exanimate.

Again. Americans have felt they were the offspring of the same parent. In what state has not the name of Pike, of Hull, or of Perry

educated the spontaneous poean? the Kentuckian, the New England-man, the Pennsylvanian, the Carolinian, each, has exulted in the triumphs, and has saddened at the disasters of his republic—Thus interest, reason, sympathy have combined to strengthen and burnish the circlet of national affiliation—and each has been created or excited by this conflict.

America is now a name of honor with mankind. It was—certainly less than respected. A superb character has expanded, which peace would have corroded and destroyed. Britain had struck down her mightiest rivals, and rode undisputed victor of ocean. It was during this full swell of elation, when her thousand ships traversed every sea, and proclaimed their laws—an infant people, with five frigates, resolved to meet, and have braved and disgraced this omnipotent fleet. A resolve so dauntless, with consequences splendid as they have been, has flashed astonishment throughout the earth.

Her unparalleled skill has been deemed the explanatory cause of the awful preponderance, which our enemy has attained. In skill, we have demonstrated, there is an equal—a superior. Its achievements in war, will lead nations to survey the works of peace which our Republic has accomplished. Sweet to the patriot will be their surprise at our roads, canals, steam-boats—but conspicuously our manufactories—at our seminaries, and literary associations—the brilliant testimonials that every art and every science are implanted, and already blooming in America.

Foreign malignity encouraged demagogues to foment domestic broils; and disunion was considered the natural production of this contest. New-England was to have been detached because her ingenuity in manufactures and navigation, was portentous to British work-shops and commerce. Chagrine has blighted the fiendish hope. British influence is death-struck. To invigorate the nerves of government; to discover the secret of drawing from all the sources of the country, thereby more easily to repel aggression, have been the only mediation of our citizens. Time will prosper the attempt. A sense of its defects, induced the substitution of the present constitution for the old confederation; the same cause will effect every other political improvement. Faction will be debilitated, and we shall be blessed with a government powerful only against our enemies. Projects against our internal concord will be abandoned after the saluta-

ry truth is known that, we see and wisely intend to pursue our own good.

The bloody atrocities, & diabolical treachery, which Britain has perpetrated against the United States, would bring back the night of barbarism did vindictiveness characterise the American people. But the world have witnessed that valor is not the highest attribute of republicans. Others have fought bravely—they have shewn in what consists the true greatness of man—When the commander of the Macedonian offered his sword, the noble-souled Decatur seized his hand, and dispelled his dejection by saying “I’ll take the hand but not the sword of one who has defended his ship so bravely.” Bainbridge’s exalted benignity, we proudly assert, has rarely been equalled in modern times, and never been surpassed in the brightest annals of antiquity. So entranced were his vanquished antagonists by his god-like tenderness and magnanimity that gratitude to their benefactor forbade the intrusion of any other feeling towards their conqueror. But distinctions are invidious where each, in camp or at sea, has combined the philanthropist with the hero. Our government deprecated the aid of Indians, and when coerced into the alternative, have assuaged their murderous spirit. Captivity has been divested of its afflictions, and those whom the chance of battle have thrown into our country, have never found it a land of strangers.

Admirable as are the qualities which this conflict has elicited, yet in them, appears nothing dreadful. Criminal ambition has not a particle of affinity to them. Our long forbearance will now incontrovertibly attest that, Columbians are as pacific as they are courageous. Infixd in the minds of nations will be the conviction, that hostilities envelope it in glory, yet to diminish human calamity, and not to trample their fellow-beings, is the fond sentiment of the new world. Honest apprehensions cannot exist, that our prosperity will give aliment to a power whose growth will be inauspicious to foreign tranquility. From this resistance then, the world will have learned, that Americans are a dauntless, skilful, wise, magnanimous, yet pacific people—a truth exquisite to national sensibility, and calculated to repress future assaults on our offenceless country. Such are among the probable results of this bold assertion of our political rights. Our energies will be excited—A comprehensive system of internal improvement, of revenue, education civil and military, of commercial intercourse, will be commenced. The command of the national faculties

will be obtained, and applied to every work that can exalt the pride, or fortify the liberties of the country. We were falling into degradation and would have sunk to vassalage—The locks of Sampson were in the hands of his enemy, and had he slept longer, he would have waked in the prison-house, and been the sport of his adversaries. War has rescued him—The arts of Delilah are more to be dreaded than the roaring lion, or the army of Philistines—May Columbia who has vanquished the one, not be a victim to the other.

Americans—The day has arrived when every one must declare for or against the Republic. To embarrass, and enfeeble your government is only to draw down calamities on yourselves. A dissatisfactory peace ensures nothing but discontent at home, and another war. Prescient policy demands that the whole powers of the country should be put forth, and set into vigorous operation. Will you yield? Can you bear bondage? Your resources are exuberant, and only degeneracy could make you hesitate. Already irradiated with a fame luminous as that of the revolution, the thought of your efforts ending in disgraceful failure cannot harass you. Wherefore, manfully proceed. Stand to your quarters, “dost give up the ship.” Go down with the flag which waves for your sailors’ rights and free trade. In the language uttered by an American Father, in the Congress of 1774—“I should advise persisting in our struggle, though it were revealed from heaven that nine hundred and ninety nine were to perish in the contest, and one only of a thousand to survive and retain his liberty.”

APPENDIX.



APPENDIX—No. I.

The ensuing extract from Mr. Clark's invaluable little work—"Sketches of the Naval History of the United States," furnishes an abstract of the reasoning on the comparative force of the British and American frigates, and exposes the subterfuges under which the vanquished bully would skulk from the taunts of a long-outraged but now exulting world.

"Much having been said on the disparity of force between the American forty-four gun frigates, and the British thirty-eight, the rates of the *Constitution* and *Guerriere*, it will, perhaps, not be out of place, to give a comparative view of the force of each. Both the American 44 gun ships, and the American 38 gun ships, are constructed on the same principles, and their guns are placed in the same relative position, forming batteries of a similar nature. The guns in each ship are placed on the main or gun-deck, the quarter-deck, and the forecastle. The gun-deck, which may be considered as the line of defence, is about 176 feet long in the American 44 gun ships, and about 160 feet in the English 38 gun ships. The line of defence therefore, in the American 44 gun ships, exceeds the English by about 16 feet. But it is to be observed, that the length of the line of defence, by no means implies strength. This essentially consists in the number of guns that can be placed in battery, with advantage, in a given line, and the strength of the ramparts and parapets, in which light the sides of the ship may be considered. A line of defence of 200 feet, mounting 30 guns in battery, would be about one-fourth weaker, and produce an effect one-fourth less, than a line of defence 150 feet mounting the same number of guns. The American 44 gun ships mount 30 twenty-four pounders on the gun-deck, 24 thirty-two pound carronades, and 2 eighteen pounders on the quarter-deck and forecastle or upper decks. The British 38 gun ships mount 28 eighteen pounders on their gun-deck, 18 thirty-two

pound carronades, and 2 eighteen pounders on their quarter-deck and fore-castle, beside a 24 pounder shifting gun. In an engagement between ship and ship, the effect produced is by the broadside, or the number of guns placed in battery on one side of the ship. So that only half the number of guns in a ship can be considered as placed in battery in its length or line of defence. The number of guns, therefore, of the American 44 gun ships, placed in battery in its line of defence of 176 feet, will be 28. The number of guns in the English 38 gun ships, placed in battery in its line of defence of 160 feet, will be 24; but as they carry a shifting gun, which may be placed in battery on either side, the number will actually be 25. So that the number of guns in battery in the American 44 gun ships, will exceed those in the English 38 gun ships only one-tenth. But the American line of defence is one-tenth longer, and consequently would be one-tenth weaker than the English, if it had only the same number of guns in battery; consequently the force of each, when the line of defence, and number of guns placed in battery are considered, is about equal.

“The American 44 gun ships carry 24 pounders on their gun-decks, the English 18 pounders. But are not 18 pounders of sufficient weight of metal for the service of large frigates, and fully calculated to produce every effect that may be required in an engagement between frigates? It has moreover been asserted by the officers of the Constitution, that the shot of the Java 18 pounders, were only *three* pounds lighter than those of the American 24 pounders, after *accurately weighing* them both. So that consequently the difference in weight of metal, was only one eighth.

“It has often been asserted in the British news-papers, that the American frigates are only 74's in disguise. It has also been asserted, by an English naval commander, in his official letter, that the American 44 gun ships, were built with the scantling of a 74. If by this assertion he meant to insinuate that the American 44 gun ships were of the same nature with a 74 or ships of the line, he has manifested an extreme want of candor, or want of professional knowledge. Seventy-four gun ships are all of the line—that is, they have guns mounted on two decks, extending the whole length of the ship or its line of defence, besides those on the quarter-deck and fore-castle, and in addition to these there are guns on the poop. The length of the line of a 74 is about the same as that of the American 44 gun

ships. A 74 gun ship mounts about 88 guns; consequently the number of guns placed in battery in her line of defence, will be 44 guns, and in the American frigate of forty-four guns, only 28 in the same line of defence. Consequently, the strength of the line of defence of a 74, is not very far from double that of an American 44 gun ship, considered in respect of the number of guns; without taking into consideration the difference in weight of metal, and the compactness and strength of sides. This, we believe, sufficiently demonstrates the illiberality and absurdity of comparing the American 44 gun frigates to 74's, with a view to disparage the rising glory of the American Navy, and to depreciate the noble exploits of her gallant tars."

APPENDIX—No. II.

This passage from Mr. Giles' speech on raising an additional military force, contains a forcible demonstration of the facility with which America can create and support a formidable army. Confirmatory of this gentleman's observations, it should be remembered, that at present, our war-department is more completely organized, and various expenses avoided which accrued in '76.

Mr. Giles—Dec. 17, 1811.—"We are not without a memorable experiment upon the population and governments of the United States at a former period. In 1775-6, we commenced the revolutionary war with Great Britain, with a population very little, if at all, exceeding two millions of souls. Let us see the number of regular troops not merely voted, but *actually* brought into the field, and *paid* for their services during the whole of that war. They are as follow—

	<i>Number of men.</i>
Total in pay in 1775	27,443
—————1776	46,891
—————1777	34,820
—————1779	27,699
—————1780	21,015
—————1781	13,292
—————1782	14,256
—————1783	13,476

"These are the regular troops actually in pay, exclusive of militia. In making this comparative estimate, I am willing in these degenerate days, to give two, nay three for one over the population of 1775-6, and it will appear that the Committee have not drawn upon the existing population beyond moderation. With a double, nay threefold population, with more than quadrupled pecuniary resources, with a capacity for furnishing *munitions* of war above one *hundred fold*, the Committee propose to draw upon the existing population, for 35,000 regular troops in the whole. In '76 there were actually in the field and paid, 46,891 regular troops, exclusive of militia. Great Britain, with a population of but little more than double that of the United States, has, at this time, in her land and naval service, perhaps *three hundred thousand men*. Yet an alarm seems to be produced here by a proposition to call into the service of the United States 35,000 men. This too for repelling the same Great Britain we encountered in 1775-6, and for the same cause. Yes, sir, it is as much a question of *Independence* now, as it was then,"

APPENDIX—No. III.

The speeches of the Hon. Langdon Cheves, and the Hon. William Lowndes, representatives of South-Carolina, are intellectual treasures, in which their constituents cannot take too much pride; nor the American people, estimate extravagantly. At a period, when a navy is "the one thing needful," the following luminously discussed points will aid enquiry, *and lead to the most gratifying deductions.*

A navy peculiarly cheap to the United-States.

"In relation to a navy, we have many advantages which the British government does not enjoy—the materials of a naval establishment are cheaper with us. The British nation imports nearly all of them from abroad—much of them from us. We have nearly all of them within ourselves. We know that ship-building is actually and practically cheaper with us than with them—we have therefore the advantages in these particulars. There is but one in which they incur, or can incur a less expence than us, and that is in the seamen who man the navy; but this, as will be seen by reference to their estimates, is not among the largest objects of their expenditure. Our establishment if properly organized and managed, and these are objects entirely within our own power, must be cheaper in proportion to its extent than that of Great Britain."

A small American navy efficient against the most powerful maritime nation.

"I am to prove that the force proposed, I mean 12 seventy-fours and 20 frigates, are sufficient to protect us in our own seas and defend our ports and harbours against the naval power of Great Britain: The first evidence which is offered in support of this proposition is *the opinion of naval men*, and if the representation of any man may be relied upon with confidence, so far at least as they are not founded in deception, I believe those of a sailor may. By naval men I have been assured, that this force is adequate to the object proposed. It is impossible for me to state with accuracy or in a manner to give a due impression of them, all the reasons which they offer in support of their opinions, but among them are those detailed in the report of the select committee. Indeed they advance the opinion and support

it with reasons, the errors of which, if they be erroneous, I am unable to discover—that it will require the enemy to employ *triple force* to put himself on a footing of equality with that of the United States. Their reasons as nearly as I can state them are these,—there must be stationed on our coast at any given time an equal force—this force cannot be fitted out, unless with great disadvantage to the service in point of expense, and in respect to the health of the crew, for much more than three months service. An equal force must be put in requisition, and kept in readiness to relieve that one station. But as the equipments of the enemy must be made in Europe, the force destined to relieve the first, must be dispatched by the time the first be supposed to have arrived on our coast—because it will be necessary at that period, as early as the arrival of the second, for the first to return—But the first could not proceed to Europe, be equipped and return to relieve the second in time, therefore *a third equivalent force is necessary*, and thus three times the force of the United States must be employed by the enemy to place himself on a footing of equality with it. History may be resorted to with confidence, to prove that neither great Britain nor any other nation, has ever been able to station for any length of time in distant seas, a force equal to that which in the opinion of naval men is sufficient to accomplish the objects proposed by the committee—the dominion of the American seas and the defence of our ports and harbors. There is one fact which above all others shews the inability of Great Britain to keep a large fleet on our coasts—from the frozen regions of the North to the Isthmus of Darien, she has not a port fit for naval equipment or repair *except Halifax*, and if we shall deprive her of that, *she will be without the means of repairing a disabled vessel in our seas*. Under such circumstances, any thing but temporary service would be utterly impracticable.

The real force of the British navy divested of false terrors.

“On the subject of the British naval force there is a great misconception. The high sounding number of a thousand ships appals the mind, and an examination of its *actual* force, and the *numerous* requisitions which are made upon it, is usually rejected as idle labor. *Let this examination be made and at least some part of the terror which it excites will vanish*. Of the 833 ships which Great Britain had in commission in 1801 (and she never had more it is believed) there were only 383 that exceeded the size and capacity of the large priva-

teers that will probably be fitted by the citizens of the United States in the event of war. Of this last number there are 142 of 64 guns, and above 22 between 50 and 60 guns—159 between 32 and 44—and 62 between 20 and 30 guns. The remainder of the vessels in commission consisted of 174 sloops, 141 gun vessels, 130 hired vessels. These hired vessels are small vessels of from 4 to 10 guns, which, it is believed, are employed only for revenue purposes. This review and enumeration I have no doubt proves the actual force of the navy of Great Britain, however great it really is, to be much inferior to the impression almost universally received from the high sounding boast of her thousand ships. Nor has the actual force of the British navy been more misconceived than the *application* of it. The common impression is, that the government can direct to any given point almost an unlimited number of ships. But if this delusive impression be removed, it will be found, that notwithstanding the greatness of the force, the points to which it *must* be destined are so numerous and dispersed, as to put it all in requisition. This I will prove, by reference to the distribution of her fleets in 1801 :

In port and fitting, of all sizes, 149 ; Guard Ships, 9 ; Channel and Irish stations, 176 ; Downs and North Seas, 164 ; Spain, Portugal, Gibraltar, 31 ; Mediterranean and Egypt, 124 ; America and Newfoundland, 12 ; West-Indies, and on passage, 47 ; Jamaica station, 37 ; Africa and Madeira, 6 ; Cape of Good Hope, East-Indies, &c. 45 ; Hospital and Prison Ships, 33—Total, 833.

From which of these stations could she have spared with safety and prudence, a portion of the force employed? Could she from all have stationed and continued in our seas a force which would have been equal, under the disadvantages pointed out, to 12 seventy-fours and 20 frigates? How much less able would she have been to have furnished a force which would be superior to a naval armament, whose expenses should equal that of the military preparations for the present year? But, it may be said the ships which Great Britain has in ordinary would be more than equal to any increase which any circumstances would require. This might be true were her seamen unlimited in numbers, and her pecuniary resources inexhaustible—but both are limited, and so must be her naval armament. To fit out the vessels which she has in ordinary, would require within a few thousands all the seamen in her merchant service, and such an addition to her annual expenditure, as the nation neither would nor could

hear. The true object of enquiry, to ascertain her efficient power, is, what number of vessels is she practically able to keep in commission, and the answer may be received in a shape the most unfavorable to my argument yet confirmatory of it, in the example of 1801, when it is confidently believed her equipment was greater, combining force and number, than at any other period of her history.

Our resources in money and seamen abundant.

There is another objection to a naval establishment to which an answer must be afforded. It is alledged, that if we build a navy we cannot man our ships without resorting to the odious and tyrannical practice of impressment. To this objection, a very satisfactory refutation may be easily given. It is believed by many, that the number of our seamen does not exceed 50 or 60,000. I know not the cause of this error—perhaps it may proceed from some estimate which embraces only able seamen, and excludes the classes of half-seamen and boys, both of which are included in the crews of vessels of war, as well as of merchant-vessels. To prove the number of our seamen, I will refer, gentlemen, to “Blodget’s *Economica*,” where it will be found, that in 1806, including the classes of half-seamen and boys, the number was 110,000. The United States had at that time 1,250,000 tons of shipping, and having now 1,488,773 tons, they must have (if this writer be accurate) a hundred and twenty-five thousand seamen. But to *prove* this *fact* like others on which I rely, so as to leave no doubt upon it, I will shew by a comparison of our present tonnage with that of Great Britain in a given year, that we must, from the amount of our tonnage, have nearly the number which results from this writer’s estimate. Great Britain, in the year 1790, had about the same tonnage which we now have, viz. 1,460,823 tons, which were manned by 112,556 seamen. It is not material to my argument, which number be taken: but if we recollect the great portion of our tonnage which is engaged in the coasting trade, the vessels employed in which are smaller, and will, in proportion to their tonnage, require more hands than the large vessels employed in the foreign trade, we may be authorised to take Mr. Blodget’s estimate. It will only take one-eighth part of this number—about 15,000 to man 12 seventy-fours, and 20 frigates. It is not to be expected, that in the event of war with a maritime power of strength, half of our seamen will continue to be employed in the merchant’s service. Those

discharged will be happy to find employment in the navy. The embargo and non-intercourse laws, it is well known, threw into our maritime cities, a great number of seamen, who would gladly have entered the navy, could they have found employment there! But it is supposed they would prefer serving on board the privateers which would issue from our ports in such numbers, and offer such advantages, as to require and attract all the seamen who should be discharged from the merchant's service. This is very improbable. There would be upwards of 60,000 thrown out of service, which would be a number sufficient to man the force proposed, and five hundred privateers besides. But it is perfectly in the power of government to institute such regulations as would insure a sufficient number of seamen for the national service, without any direct restraint upon their will, by limiting the number of privateers should it be necessary. Taking, however, the worst view of the subject, it would be unnecessary to resort to impressment. I believe the nations of the continent have never resorted to impressment to man their fleets. I do not speak with certainty as to the fact, but I believe, their practice was to cause seamen to be registered, as our militia are, and when necessary, a portion of them was drafted for the public service. The service is in a great degree the peculiar duty of our seamen, as the exertion must always be in a great degree for their defence. Their home is on the ocean, and their defence of the national rights upon it, may fairly be assimilated to the defence of the lines by those who dwell upon the land."

A Comparison of American and British Tonnage and Seamen in sundry years.

<i>American.</i>	<i>Tons.</i>	<i>Men & Boys.</i>	<i>British.</i>	<i>Tons.</i>	<i>Men & Boys.</i>	<i>Vessels Annually built.</i>
1806	1,250,000	110,000	1790	1,460,823	112,556	
1811	1,424,783	125,000	1791	1,511,411	117,044	
In 1810 were built in the			1792	1,540,144	118,286	1798 89,319
U. States,	127,575 tons of		1800	1,905,438	142,661	1799 98,044
new shipping.						1800 126,268

EXTRACTS FROM MR. WM. LOWNDES' SPEECH ON THE NAVY—JAN. 21, 1812.

A Navy peculiarly cheap to the United States.

"My honorable colleague (Mr. Cheves) has calculated the expense of building and maintaining a navy of 12 ships of the line and 20 frigates, and has explained the principles on which his calcula-

tions have been founded. I have not myself attempted to estimate the probable expense of maintaining 12 ships of the line and 20 frigates with any precision, but I cannot doubt the fairness of the rule which deduces it from the expense of such a force to England. This is the rule which I understood my colleague to have employed. It has not been disputed in debate—it has been in conversation. Many gentlemen have objected to the estimate of the expenses of a navy during war, in which (as they suppose) no allowance is made for the peculiar expenses which war involves. To have all our ships safe at the end of the contest is observed to be rather a sanguine expectation. But if the rate of expense in the estimate of my colleague was deduced from the rate of English expense during war, these objections must be altogether groundless. Now it *was* deduced from the expense which is found sufficient to maintain the English navy in a state of unimpaired strength during war. The English expense from which it was inferred, included the charge of docks, and navy yards, of the repair of old ships, and of the building of new ones. It included pensions to their officers, and even the support of the prisoners taken from their enemies. I have on my table a detailed account of the English naval expenditure for a year of the last war—the whole amount was about £12,500,000, and of this sum fully £4,500,000 were applied to what may be considered the contingent expenses of the navy. Now is there any reason to suppose that the contingent expenses of our navy would be greater in proportion to its force than this? And if not greater, has not allowance been made for the capture of some of our ships, or in other words, for the building of new ones? It is true, that from the superiority of English sailors to their present enemies, England loses little by capture, and it may be supposed, that from the greater frequency and severity of our conflicts, when we shall be engaged in war against her, our contingent expenses may be greater in proportion to the number of our ships than hers. But there are many expenses to which she is *necessarily* subject, from which we shall be exempt. I will instance that resulting from blockading squadrons, and that from repairs in colonial and foreign ports. These can appear inconsiderable to no man who has given his attention in any degree to the subject. Naval men, I believe, would not contradict me, if I were to state the expense of a ship employed in a strict blockade, and particularly during the winter months, as fully double that of a ship engaged in ordinary service.

In fact England finds the expense too great for her finances, and has been *obliged in some measure to give up the practice*. The other article of expenditure to which I have referred, I shall not attempt to estimate with any precision. It must, however, be obvious to every man, that the ships of war of England must frequently be repaired, and refitted in distant countries. In these the most scrupulous fidelity and economy on the part of her officers, cannot prevent the expense from being frequently extravagant. The most salutary regulations, and provident instructions on the part of the administration at home, cannot prevent her officers from being sometimes careless and fraudulent. I recollect an instance of the enormous expense involved in the distant services required from the British navy, which I cannot pretend to state with accuracy, but in which I hope not to be substantially wrong. Sir Home Popham (a distinguished officer in the English navy) had under his command in the last war two or three frigates in the East-Indies. They had left England in good condition, and their repairs for two or three years, and the supply of the different articles of equipment which they occasionally required, exceeded, I believe, the prime cost of the vessels themselves. These two items of expenditures, blockading squadrons, and repairs in distant countries (to neither of which an American navy would be liable) will be acknowledged, I think, to justify the conclusion, that the contingent expenses of the English navy must be as great in proportion to its force, as ours would be in war—and therefore that the rule employed in the calculation of my colleague, was correct.

Our resources in money and Seamen abundant.

But our resources for the equipment of a navy appear to the honorable gentlemen on the other side, as deficient in respect to men and money—Sailors in this country cannot be obtained in sufficient numbers without impressment. It is not necessary to enquire whether for the defence of their peculiar rights, the services of a marine militia may not be required. *There is no reason to doubt our being able to procure the voluntary services of our seamen.* If we shall at any time be engaged in a war (like that with France in '98) which shall leave the greater part of our trade unaffected, the wages of sailors will indeed be high, but the number required will be small, and the government can afford high wages. In a war of a different character—against a nation powerful at sea, your sailors will be thrown

out of employment, and their wages will be necessarily low. But gentlemen object to this reasoning, on the supposition, that in such a case our sailors will all engage in privateers. The notion that in *any* war there will be a demand in this country for more than 30,000 sailors for privateers, is surely an extravagant one. But it has been shewn by my colleague, that in a war which should diminish our trade by one half (and a war requiring any great naval exertion, would necessarily do this) 30 or 40,000 seamen may be employed in privateers, and a sufficient number would remain for your public ships. But are not your privateers as much a part of the naval force of the nation, as your ships of war? It has been said indeed that they are the most useful part. Now if the government should believe (what neither sober reflection nor the *experience of other nations* can permit a doubt) that this part of your force cannot be in any degree serviceable, unless supported by a fleet—then surely a limitation to its extent, which would be necessary even to the interests of its owners, cannot fairly be objected to. The law just passed for raising 25,000 men, provides I think for only one regiment of cavalry. Now it is very possible that a much larger proportion of the 25,000 men than can be accommodated in this regiment, may choose to go to Canada on horseback—They must be disappointed, and either not go into the army at all, or go into the service which they least desire. No man has hitherto denounced the act as on this account tyrannical and oppressive. Yet this case seems to be a true parallel to the other. In the naval as in the military service, the interest of the country requires the employment of different sorts of force, and the object may be attained with equal fairness in both services, by limiting the amount of the favorite force.

But why should we speculate loosely on a subject on which we have already had some experience? We have now, I believe, as many seamen as soldiers in our service. Have we found more difficulty in procuring them? An addition to the army has become necessary, and even with the unexampled bounty which has been offered, there are men who doubt whether the enlistment will be very soon completed—Without any bounty I have been informed that the number in our naval service may be greatly increased. Is this not a practical decision of the question? An application to the Secretaries of the War and Navy will, I am sure, confirm it.

A small American Navy efficient against the most powerful maritime nation.

But the great difficulty in the subject before the committee, consists in the question as to the adequacy of the force which has been mentioned. I have said that I believe (with my colleague) that in the present state of Europe twelve 74's & 20 frigates may reasonably be expected to give us the command of the American seas. I do not mean that they would prevent British vessels from ever appearing off our coast, but they would prevent their maintaining a permanent station there—they would prevent their blockading our harbours. What force must England maintain in order to blockade forts on this side the Atlantic? It has been said of a force at least triple that which is blockaded. This opinion (which is supported by high professional authority) has been supposed to rest on the *necessity* of what may be called a *double relief* of vessels—But without expressing any opinion in regard to this argument, it is, I think, sufficiently clear without it, that England in order to *blockade our fleet must* maintain three ships for one. The accidents to which a blockading squadron on our coast must be always liable—the probability of its being scattered—of one of its vessels being damaged and obliged to go for repair to some distant port, would render it not only dangerous, but desperate to attempt a blockade with equal numbers; because the equality will soon cease. It is not to be presumed that England would attempt to blockade twelve ships of the line in American ports by fewer than eighteen of her ships. Now these vessels could not remain at sea forever, they must be relieved—they must be repaired. For this purpose (without considering of victualing and watering) eighteen other ships would be indispensable. Thirty-six ships of the line, then, would be necessary in order to give England the command of the American sea. Could she spare these?——To shew that she *could not*, my colleague has mentioned the stations occupied by her squadrons, and has asked which of these could be prudently weakened? The *conclusion* which he has made from this induction is *confirmed* by the *history of the naval actions* of the present and the last war. In Lord Howe's victory, in Lord St. Vincent's, at the battle of the Nile, of Camperdown, of Trafalgar, in all these the English force was *inferior* to that of their enemy. Battles, on the *issue* of which depended the possession of a most important province—the dominion, perhaps, of the seas—the safety of the state—have been trusted to 15 & twenty ships.

In the battle of Cape St. Vincent the disparity was 15 to 27—Why, in these *important* actions, did England suffer her fleets to be *outnumbered*? Do gentlemen suppose it was from a spirit of chivalry—from a romantic valor which disdained to calculate the number of its enemies? They do the English admiralty great injustice—The *inferiority* was the *result of necessity*, and not of choice. And if they could detach but 13 ships of the line to dispute the conquest of Egypt, it should seem improbable that they can spare 36 to dispute the command of the American seas.

The present, the proper time to build a navy.

At some future time, however, some of these gentlemen appear to think it not impossible that it may be wise to build a navy. But what are the circumstances which can render it wise to build one hereafter, and which do not require it now? Shall we build one when we have *all the materials & artizans* which are necessary to its construction? *We have them now*. Shall we build one when the *number* of our *seamen* enable us to rank among the *first naval powers* of the world? In the *number* of our *seamen* we are *now* inferior only to England: But perhaps we may have no occasion for a navy; perhaps we have found that without one our commerce is every where undisturbed, and all the nations of the old world friendly and just. There is scarcely one which has not plundered us. *We have now the means*. We now feel the necessity for a naval force; the arguments by which it is assailed now, may be employed as well at any future time to perpetuate our dependence on the nations of Europe.

But the *command* of the *American seas*, could not, it is said, if you had it, secure your commerce. Your ships beyond the Cape of Good Hope, in the Baltic, on the coasts of France would not be benefited by it. It would secure your sea-coast from being plundered or ravaged. It would give direct protection to the *coasting trade*, which is acknowledged to be *more important than any other*. It would indirectly protect all your trade—because it would render it the interest of every nation to *respect* the rights of a *people* who would not receive in war *more injury than they could inflict*.

It was said in some former debate (by Mr. Clay, speaker) that the true motive of the injuries which England has done us, was her jealousy of a commercial rival. I believe this to be the opinion of the Committee. But it is strange that those who entertain this opi-

nion should expect to obtain an honorable peace without any naval exertion. If Canada be conquered (as they say that in that case it must never be restored) it is not easy to discover any strong inducement to peace, which England would have, in the consideration, that you had her colony and meant to keep it. To succeed in a negotiation with a rival people, you must convince them that they will gain as much as you by the treaty which you propose. To terminate your war with England honorably, you must know that she will lose as well as you by its continuance. But when your whole trade—your foreign and your coasting trade are destroyed (and without a naval force it seems to me that they must be) what argument would your most dexterous mediator employ, to show that the loss of England would be equal to your own from the continuance of the war? What equivalent would he offer her for the restoration of that commerce which peace would give you? What passion or what interest on her part would he oppose to that commercial jealousy which the war would gratify, but would not satiate? I know not. But if the *resources of the country* be employed prudently, economically, *vigorously*, in the *acquisition of a naval force*—the command of your own seas obtained—your coasting trade protected—the West-India trade of your enemies threatened—then indeed you may negotiate on equal terms—You may obtain respect for your flag, without sending a national ship then, in every sea of Europe and Asia—and will be paid in return for the safety which peace with you, must give to the trade of England with her colonies—Your war will then have been honorable—your peace will be secure.

EXTRACT FROM COMMON SENSE.

The munificent endowment in every requisite of naval defence, with which Providence has distinguished the United States, has been depicted by Paine, in his celebrated pamphlet, "Common Sense," with that nervous perspicuity, which characterised that dauntless advocate of liberty, and inflexible champion of American rights. To honor the past, to edify the present generation, the work should be reprinted.—1776.

"No country on the globe is so happily situated, or so internally capable of raising a fleet as America. Tar, timber, iron and cordage are her natural produce. We need go abroad for nothing. Whereas the Dutch, who make large profits by hiring out their ships of war

to the Spaniards and Portuguese, are obliged to import most of the materials they use. We ought to view the building a fleet as an article of commerce, it being the *natural manufacture* of this country. It is the best money we can lay out. A navy when finished is worth more than its cost, and is that nice point in national policy, in which commerce and protection are united. Let us build; if we want them not, we can sell, and by that means replace our paper currency with ready gold and silver.

“ In point of *manning* a fleet, people in general, run into great errors; it is not necessary that one fourth part should be sailors. The Terrible, privateer, Capt. Death, s codd the hottest engagement of any ship last war, yet had not *twenty* sailors on board, though her complement of men was upwards of *two hundred*. A few able and social sailors will soon instruct a sufficient number of active landmen in the common work of a ship. Wherefore, we never can be more capable to begin on maritime matters than now, while our timber is standing, our fisheries blocked up, and our sailors and shipwrights out of employ. Men of war of 70 and 80 guns were built forty years ago in New England, and why not the same now? *Ship-building is America's greatest pride*, and in which she will in time *excel the whole world*. The great empires of the East are mostly inland, and consequently excluded from the possibility of rivalling her. Africa is in a state of barbarism; and *no power in Europe hath either such an extent of sea-coast, or such an internal supply of materials*. Where nature hath given the one, she has withheld the other; to America *only* hath she been liberal of *both*. The vast empire of Russia is almost shut out from the sea, wherefore her boundless forest, her tar, iron, and cordage are only articles of commerce.

“ In point of *safety* ought we to be *without a fleet*? We are not the little people now, which we were sixty years ago. At that time we might have trusted our property in the streets, or fields rather, and slept securely without locks or bolts to our doors or windows. The case is now altered, and *our methods of defence ought to improve with our increase of property*. A common pirate, twelve months ago might have come up the Delaware, and laid the city of Philadelphia under instant contribution, for what sum he pleased; and the same might have happened to other places. These are circumstances which demand our attention, and point out the *necessity of naval protection*.

“ Some perhaps, will say, that after we have made it up with Britain, she will protect us. Can we be so unwise as to mean, that she

shall keep a navy in our harbours for that purpose? Common sense will tell us that the power which hath endeavored to subdue us, is of all others, the most improper to defend us. *Conquest may be effected under the pretence of friendship*; and ourselves after a long and brave resistance be at last *cheated into slavery*. The English list of ships of war, is long and formidable, but not a tenth part of them are at any one time fit for service; numbers of them not in being. Yet their names are pompously continued in the list if only a plank be left of the ship: and not a fifth part of such as are fit for service, can be spared on any one station, at one time. The East and West Indies, Mediterranean, Africa, and other parts over which Britain extends her claim, make large demands upon the navy. From a mixture of prejudice and *inattention* we have contracted a *false notion* respecting the navy of England, and have talked as if we should have the whole to encounter at once, and for that reason, supposed that we must have one as large; which, not being instantly practicable, has been made use of by a set of disguised Tories to discourage our beginning thereon. Nothing can be further from the truth than this; for if America had only a *twentieth* part of the naval force of Britain, she would be by far an *over-match* for her. Because as we neither have nor claim any foreign dominion, our whole force would be employed on our own coast, where we should have two to one the advantage of those who had three or four thousand miles to sail over before they could attack us, and the same distance to return in order to refit and recruit. And although Britain, by her fleet, hath a check over *our* trade to Europe, we have *as large* an one *over her* trade to the West Indies, which by lying in the neighbourhood of the continent, is entirely at its mercy.

“ In almost every article of defence we abound. Hemp flourishes even to rankness, so that we need not want cordage. Our iron is superior to that of other countries. Our small arms equal to any in the world. Cannon we cast at pleasure. Saltpetre and gunpowder we are every day producing. *Our knowledge is hourly improving*. Resolution is our inherent character, and courage hath never yet forsaken us. Wherefore what is it that we want? Why is it that we hesitate? From Britain we can expect nothing, but *ruin*. If she is once admitted to the government of America again,—*this continent will not be worth living in*.

ERRATA.

The Reader is requested to correct the following, among the slight topographical errors, which appear in the preceding pages.

Page 5 for <i>Handcock</i> ,	read "Hancock"
6 for <i>severed</i> ,	read "Reversed."
8 for <i>villany</i> ,	read "Villainy."
- for <i>achievment</i> ,	read "Achievement."
- for <i>synonemy</i> ,	read "Synonyme."
9 for <i>war's despair</i> ,	read "Despair."
16 for <i>abettors of war</i> ,	read "Abettors of a war of ambition."
23 for <i>germanating</i> ,	read "Germinating."
30 for <i>rest</i> ,	read "Zest."
31 for <i>exists</i> ,	read "Can exist."
32 for <i>mechation</i> ,	read "Meditation."

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1771

**This book is under no circumstances to be
taken from the Building**

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1510

